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I. INTRODUCTION

State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Circuit Court is a landmark in
Wisconsin Supreme Court history. 2 The outcome of the case was unremarkable-the statute at issue was and remains obscure. 3 Rather, Kalal is significant because the Court's discussion of statutory interpretation moved the entire legal system of the state towards textualism and away from more malleable interpretative methods. Kalal gave Wisconsin courts a whole new framework for statutory interpretation. The case mandates that a court must first ask whether the statute's text is ambiguous. 4 If not, the court should apply the plain meaning of the text. Only if the text is ambiguous may a court resort to extrinsic sources to resolve the ambiguity. 5 Kalal deemphasized legislative history as an unreliable 13 Unique among other types of public law, the state constitution is not subject to Kalal. When the Wisconsin Supreme Court interprets the Wisconsin Constitution, it instead uses a tripartite methodology first formalized in Busé v. Smith in 1974: plain meaning, legislative and popular history, and contemporaneous acts of the legislature.
14 As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated in the decision quoted as the epigram of this Article, Busé requires courts to go beyond the plain meaning of the constitution's text, even when that meaning is unambiguous. 15 The court's current approach to state constitutional interpretation is flawed because of its dependence on unreliable tools to perform an impossible task-discerning the hidden intent and unexpressed purpose of millions of voters. The Kalal framework avoids these pitfalls and advances positive values for the rule of law. As it has already done in other areas of public law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should extend Kalal's methodology to state constitutional interpretation. 14. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976 In the earliest days of the state, the Wisconsin Supreme Court used the same methodology to interpret both constitutional and statutory texts. 16 Until 1974, the court relied on classical principles for all interpretive questions. The court would begin with the plain meaning of the words used. 17 The court looked to the original public meaning of the text; " [t] he meaning of the constitutional provision having been once firmly established as of the time of its adoption, such meaning continues forever, unless it is changed or modified by the constitution."
18 One guide to this public meaning was popular dictionaries. 19 In Kayden Industries, Inc., decided in 1967, the court declared:
Where there is no ambiguity in the literal terms of the [constitutional] provision under consideration there is no room for judicial construction. . . . And the court may not venture outside the plain meaning of a provision in order to create an ambiguity and then resolve the ambiguity by what it finds outside. 20 16. State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 1849) ("In deciding this question, our only guide is the constitution, in construing which we are to be governed by the same general rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to statutes."); see also State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 191, 204 N.W. 803, 807 (1925) ("[I] n construing the constitution we are governed by the same rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to statutes." (citing Bond, 2 Pin. at 184)); Akerly v. Vilas, 24 Wis. 165, 181 (1869) .
17. Payne v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 555, 259 N.W. 437, 439 (1935) ("'[I] t is presumed that words appearing in a constitution have been used according to their plain, natural and usual signification and import, and the courts are not at liberty to disregard the plain meaning of words of a constitution in order to search for some other conjured intent.'" (quoting approvingly from 6 RULING CASE LAW Constitutional Law § 47 (William M McKinney et al. eds., 1929) )); B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327 (1925) .
18. State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 403, 216 N.W. 509, 511-12 (1927) ; see also Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 368, 133 N.W. 209, 222 (1911) (Barnes, J., concurring) ; id. at J., concurring) . But see id. at 349 (majority opinion) ("When an eighteenth century constitution forms the charter of liberty of a twentieth century government must its general provisions be construed and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century conditions and ideals? Clearly not.").
19. Ekern, 187 Wis. at 194 (looking to a definition from the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia). But see State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 97, 228 N.W. 593, 598 (1930) ("We realize fully that a matter of this kind ought not to be determined wholly upon the basis of dictionary definitions; that what is to be sought is the intent as expressed in the constitution as amended.").
20. Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447, 453-54 (1967 ) (citing State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1964 for the first proposition and Estate of Ries, 259 Wis. 453, 459, 49 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1951) When a constitutional provision was ambiguous, the court sought to follow "the real meaning and substantial purpose of those who adopted it."
21
In these cases, the court attempted to effect the purpose of the amendment and the intended meaning of the framers. 22 The primary sources used to establish them were the debates at the 1846 and 1848 constitutional conventions. 23 The court also considered past practice by responsible government officials and contemporaneous legislative construction. 24 The justices also reviewed analogous constitutional provisions from other states. 25 Wis. 21, 81, 151 N.W. 331, 350 (1915). 23. Heil, 242 Wis. at 55; State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860, 862 (1928); Owen, 160 Wis. at 81. 24. State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 114-15, 186 N.W. 729, 730 (1922); Owen, 160 Wis. at 111 (quoting Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 68, (1871) Wis. 2d 574, 577, 263 N.W.2d 218, 221 (1978) ; Heil, 242 Wis. at 56-57; B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 186 Wis. 10, 16, 202 N.W. 324, 326 (1925) ; Jacobs v. Major (Jacobs I), 132 Wis. 2d 82, 101, 390 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Ct. App. 1986 Text and historical context should make the purpose of most amendments apparent. A plain reading of the text of the amendment will usually reveal a general, unified purpose. A court might also find other extrinsic contextual sources helpful in determining what the amendment sought to change or affirm, including the previous constitutional structure, legislative and public debates over the amendment's adoption, the title of the joint resolution, the common name for the amendment, the question submitted to the people for a vote, legislative enactments following adoption of the amendment, and other such sources."). Also, the court has developed its own line of precedents to which it defaults for particular provisions of the constitution. See, e.g., State v. Abbott Labs., 2012 WI 62, ¶ ¶ 29-44, 341 Wis. 2d 510, 816 N.W.2d 145 (analyzing the constitutional provision creating a right to a civil jury trial by ascertaining whether a cause of action existed at common law in 1848, and if so, if the cause was recognized as "at law" as opposed to in equity (citing Vill. Food & Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶ ¶ 10, 13, 15-16, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177) When conducting a historical analysis of text from the 1848 constitution, the court continues to rely primarily on records from the drafting conventions. 41 The court may also consider contemporaneous practices Wis. 2d 176, 199, 558 N.W.2d 108, 117 (1997) ("Although the interpretation of a word used in a constitutional provision is not determinative of the word's meaning in all constitutional provisions, it may prove helpful.").
39. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 39 ("Our established constitutional analysis includes an examination of the practices in effect at the time the amendment was passed. Following the lead of the legislature, we have looked to the practices and interpretations of other states."); Jacobs II, 139 Wis. 2d at 514-19 (looking at similar cases analyzing cognate provisions from California, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, and Washington). But see Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 54 ("The effort of tracing the evolution of these clauses in other states is not warranted, because, as we have discussed, our state has its own constitutional history that developed the provision we today examine.").
40. State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 394, 204 N.W. 589, 593 (1925) ("[W] here technical terms were in use prior to the adoption of the constitution, such terms were used in the constitution in the sense in which they were understood at common law."); accord Mich. Coal. of State Emp. Unions v Mich. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 634 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Mich. 2001) ("[I]f a constitutional phrase is a technical legal term or a phrase of art in the law, the phrase will be given the meaning that those sophisticated in the law understood at the time of enactment unless it is clear from the constitutional language that some other meaning was intended."); cf State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[T] echnical or specially-defined words or phrases [in statutes] are given their technical or special definitional meaning." (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶ ¶ 8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 663, 660 N.W.2d 656) ).
41. Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 61 ("The debates are our best information about the practices at the time the constitution was adopted."); City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 27 (quoting from drafters at the 1848 convention); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 685-90, 546 N.W.2d 123, 129-31 (1996) When looking at amendments to the constitution rather than original text, the court considers legislative history from the amendment's drafting and passage through the legislature as well as popular history from the statewide ratification campaign. 43 Wisconsin has few sources of legislative history because the legislature does not transcribe its floor sessions or committee hearings. only because opposing legislators and groups did not write the amendment, but because they had an incentive to distort its impact in their attempt to defeat it. 55 The debates and explanations of the provision during the statewide ratification campaign are also used to illuminate a clause. 56 The court operates on the presumption that, "when informed, the citizens of Wisconsin are familiar with the elements of the constitution and with the laws, and that the information used to educate the voters during the ratification campaign provides evidence of the voters' intent." 57 To discern the voters' intent, the court uses several sources, primarily newspaper stories, 58 columns, 59 and editorials. 60 It has also looked at public opinion ("[T] he more reasonable and obvious conclusion is that voters who ended up favoring the amendment were, generally speaking, persuaded by statements of the proponents . . . ."); see also id. ¶ ¶ 43-45 (mentioning that opponent statements are relevant only when they "reflect a congruence of views or a common core understanding of the meaning or impact of the amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted) In all events, "[t]he framers' intent . . . has special significance when we are dealing with a matter which was demonstrably contemplated by the framers."
62 Similarly, the court may also consider whether there exists "a long-standing, uniform and continuous interpretation of a constitutional provision" that stretches from the provision's proposal to the present.
63
Looking to contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous legislative constructions of an amendment is usually straightforward. "The legislature's subsequent actions are a crucial component of any constitutional analysis because they are clear evidence of the legislature's understanding of that amendment."
64
This entire interpretive enterprise is undertaken seeking "to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it . . . [and to construe it] so as to promote the objects for which [it was] framed and adopted."
65 This section has traced the historical evolution of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's approach to interpretation of the state constitution, from the framing era through the Busé framework in modern times.
III. THE WEAKNESS OF THE COURT'S CURRENT METHOD
The second prong of the Busé methodology looks at history from the tion and lasting right up to it. Id. at 597. But see Appling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ ¶ 59-60 (quoting from the website of an amendment supporter, then quoting from a television appearance by another amendment supporter Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, in her concurring opinion in Kalal, wrote, "Legislative history, especially legislative committee reports and the congressional record, has gotten a bad reputation in recent years in federal circles because legislative history may be manufactured by both proponents and opponents of the legislation . . . ."
67 Although she tries to reassure us that the "manufacturing of legislative history is a less well-known and less perfected skill" in Wisconsin, 68 she provides no support to justify her distinction between federal legislative history, which she poo-poos, and state legislative history, which she positively advocates. Ken Dortzbach observed in 1996 that "state courts do not hear as many politically-charged cases [,] which typically lend themselves to abuse or misuse of legislative history." 69 Since he wrote that, the court has used legislative history when deciding major constitutional cases dealing with gun rights and gambling, and it may soon do so regarding same-sex unions.
70
These hot-button issues requiring interpretation of relatively recent amendments offer interested parties the opportunity and incentive to manufacture and manipulate legislative history.
Courts' experience with federal legislative history provides insight into the dangers Wisconsin courts can expect. First, Judge Ken Starr has said that "technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress will appear to embrace their particular view in a given statute."
71 Admittedly, not as much legislative history comes out of the state legislature, 72 but the possibility and incentives are certainly present for legisla- REV. 195, 214 (1983) ); ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 972-73; see also Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶ 60, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("Thus resort to a dictionary can be, as Justice Scalia has written of the use of legislative history, 'the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends. '" (citing Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) Fourth, the use of legislative history to discern the "intent" of the legislative body operates on the mistaken assumption that a single, unified intent exists. Yet this is plainly not so, whether the body under examination is the U.S. Congress with its 535 members or the Wisconsin Legislature with its 132. In either instance, "A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs." A healthy skepticism should also characterize a court's approach to popular history from the statewide ratification campaign. Popular history suffers the same four flaws as legislative history. First, it can be strategically created during the campaign to influence later judicial interpre-(Bradley, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on how to read statements from delegates to the constitutional conventions); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 701-05, 546 N.W.2d 123, 135-37 (1996) (Wilcox, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority on how to read several letters by the drafter of a constitutional amendment); Grosse v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 97, 117-20, 513 N.W.2d 592, 601-02 (1994) Second, it can be sifted through or manipulated by an advocate or judge to support his or her preferred outcome in a case. 85 If substantial legislative history is available for an average bill in Congress, imagine the amount of popular history generated by a yearlong statewide campaign across Wisconsin, a state with thirty-one daily newspapers, scores of other newspapers and magazines, hundreds of television and radio outlets, 86 and multi-million dollar campaigns.
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Third, even well-meaning people will likely find much of the popular history confusing or in conflict with itself. 88 As Professor Jane Schacter, writing while a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, has argued, "Judicial immersion in the unwieldy body of images, words, and political slogans that may comprise the media coverage and advertising related to a ballot measure is likely to intensify, not reduce, the problems of indeterminacy that already undermine the search for popular intent."
89 It may also be that the popular history was distorted by political forces trying to shape, or misshape, voters' perception of the amendment.
90
Fourth and finally, this endeavor starts from the flawed assumption that popular history can provide a guide to the "intent" of the voters. 86. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2011 -2012 , at 770-84 (2011 (Oct. 31, 2007) , http://www.wisdc.org/referendumgrou ps2006.php (estimating that groups for and against the Wisconsin Marriage Amendment spent over $5 million to affect the statewide ratification referendum).
88. Silak, supra note 56, at 41 ("Despite a court's careful attention to all the extrinsic aids . . . the intent behind an initiative may remain obscure.").
89. Schacter, supra note 80, at 144. 90. Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 542 n.24 (Mich. 2008) ("It perhaps can also be discerned that supporters of legislative and constitutional initiatives often tend to downplay the effect of such initiatives during public debate, while opponents tend to overstate their effect.").
91. Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 18 (1997) ("[I]t seems unlikely that judges can accurately discern the 'popular intent' or even that such a clear, monolithic intent actually exists."); id. at 28 ("There is no principled way to impute a clear, consistent, or illuminating intent to the electorate."); Schacter, supra 34306-mqt_97- In addition to these four problems, popular history from ratification campaigns faces its own unique problems. The Wisconsin Supreme Court relies primarily on newspaper reports, columns, and editorials for the popular history of the ratification campaign. Yet, especially in an era where newspapers are in decline, the reality is that television and radio advertising "take[] on greater importance as the primary means of voter persuasion."
93 But even if the court were to start looking at campaign ads and materials as part of its analysis, 94 it would find that they are "frequently too diffuse, disparate, indeterminate, or biased to be effective as judicial sources of popular intent." 95 Moreover, these campaign materials rarely "traffic in 'the arcane, albeit potent, details' of the initiatives they tout or disparage."
96
Courts in Wisconsin and elsewhere have recognized the problems inherent in reliance on popular history to discern voter intent. The Supreme Court of Missouri, for instance, has labeled "representations made here and there at large over the state by private individuals and organizations in advocacy of a cause at an election" as "neither conclusive nor persuasive evidence" for interpretation. 97 The Supreme Court note 80, at 111 ("First, the popular intent behind an initiative statute is largely illusory and provides an unstable anchor for judicial interpretation."); id. at 124-25 ("[T]he problem of aggregating multiple individual intentions, substantial as it is in the context of the legislative process, is compounded by the daunting scale of direct lawmaking. Even if we granted that individual voter intent existed-a dubious premise, I will argue-courts simply could not cumulate what may be millions of voter intentions."). Thus, courts which seek "some mean intent of the average reasonable informed voter" rely on a "misguided faith. 95. Schacter, supra note 80, at 130; see also Silak, supra note 56, at 29 ("As with any advertising campaign, the meaning and effect of an initiative can be subject to distortion.").
96. Smith, supra note 56, at 275 (quoting Schacter, supra note 80, at 158 of Arkansas followed a similar rule, reasoning, When the debates arose over the question of adoption by the people, the amendment had already been framed by the Legislature and referred to the people; and the opinions expressed during the progress of the campaign did not enter into the shaping of the language of the amendment, so as to shed light on its intended meaning.
98
Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan, writing for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, similarly declined to ascribe any significance to a brief written by the chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library in support of a proposed amendment, saying:
[W]e question whether contemporaneously written briefs aimed at garnering political support for a proposed constitutional amendment can ever be considered persuasive when a court later attempts to interpret the constitutional provision that was amended. Today's Wisconsin courts would be wise to recall Chief Justice Heffernan's words, and those of other state high courts, in rejecting the use of popular history as a first resort for interpretation.
In addition to newspaper stories, the other place the court has looked when discerning the intent of the voters is public opinion polling. 100 The experience of the U.S. Supreme Court in citing opinion polls Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 43, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ; see also Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, An extensive body of social science literature describes how methodological and other errors can affect the reliability and validity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a population derived from various sampling techniques. Everything from variations in the survey methodology, such as the choice of the target population, the sampling design used, the questions asked, and the statistical analyses used to interpret the data can skew the results. 102 Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that in a previous decision involving the death penalty, the Court had refused to "rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations as public opinion polls." 103 In another death-penalty case, the Court noted but declined to rely on public opinion polling, saying, "The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely." 104 The text of the amendment that voters approved is the "objective indicator" of the desires of the people, not opinion polling.
Moreover, the reliability of the pollsters that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has relied upon in the past is widely questioned by expert observers of Wisconsin politics. In Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., the court cited polls by St. Norbert College (SNC)/Wisconsin Public Radio and the University of Wisconsin Extension. 105 In State v. Cole and State v. Hamdan, the justices looked to two polls sponsored by the Public Policy Forum, a non-profit think tank based in Milwaukee. 106 The publicly available polling data on the marriage amendment and its impact on civil unions, cited by then-Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager and University of Wisconsin (UW) Law Professor David Schwartz in their opinion letters on domestic partnerships, 107 Christofferson has criticized the Wisconsin media because they "usually treat all polls equallyone taken by a college class is as good as one taken by one of the country's top political pollsters." 117 In the past, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has looked to polls taken by a college class;
118 it should not do so in the future.
Rather than using college polls with significant reliability issues, the court may be tempted to look at professional polls done by organizations interested in a referendum. These polls, after all, usually have larger samples, screen for likely voters, and are taken over industrystandard polling windows.
119 But the court should avoid these polls as well, for three reasons. First, groups interested in the outcome of a referendum have a strong incentive to ask the question in such a way as to lead respondents to a desired answer. A poll that exaggerates support for the group's position may be used to create a "bandwagon" effect that helps in the poll that really matters on Election Day. 120 Second, these groups only publicly release polls that show good results; no candidate ever gave the media a poll showing him or her getting crushed. Third, these releases often offer only broad descriptions and bare details-not question wording or order. Candidates, Stop Campaigning! Poll Says You're Going Backwards, UPPITY WISCONSIN, (July 15, 2010, 3:11 PM) , http://uppitywis.org/candidates-stopcampaigning-poll-says-youre-going-backwards (" [The UWSC poll] In sum, polling is a complicated endeavor. As the foregoing section has illustrated, a number of methodological questions must be asked to determine the quality of a poll. Courts, especially those on the appellate level, do not possess the necessary expertise to parse polling data. Judges are not pollsters, and they should not pretend to be. Nor should they use survey data to reinterpret the meaning of the text that the voters approved in the only poll that matters: the ratification vote on election day.
Finally, near-contemporaneous legislative enactments may be a poor guide when seeking the intent of the enacting legislature. 128 The people of Wisconsin ratified the amendment in the fall 2006 general election. 129 On that very same day, voters elected a Democratic majority to the state senate. 130 Obviously, voters' general preference for Democrats did not include a specific preference for that party's stance on the marriage amendment. Two years later, Wisconsinites elected a Democratic majority in the state assembly while retaining the senate majority. 131 With the governorship also in hand, the new majorities passed a state budget that included domestic-partner benefits for state employees and a statewide domestic-partnership registry.
132
Should these actions, taken only three years after the amendment's passage, guide the court in applying its language? Obviously not. The legislature that passed those budget provisions was substantially different from the one that passed the amendment-many members had turned over, and more importantly, majority control of both houses had changed parties. This example illustrates that changing circumstances may make near-contemporaneous legislative decisions an unreliable guide for interpreting constitutional provisions.
In sum, the court's current methodology for interpreting constitutional provisions relies on flawed sources. Legislative history can be abused by those who write it in an attempt to shape the interpretation of the law, and by those using it in court, who may select nonrepresentative or misleading sources. Even when honestly evaluated, legislative history can be confusing and inconsistent. Additionally, the entire project begins from the false premise that a unified intent can be divined from anything other than the words that the majority agreed to enact.
Recent scholarship has shown that popular history from the statewide ratification campaign suffers these same flaws. Popular history that relies on newspaper clippings, moreover, prioritizes a source that is quickly losing relevance over a source that affects many more voters-namely, campaign advertising. Yet this source too has problems as an interpretive guide. The court's other source of voter intent, public opinion polling, varies widely in quality, precision, and objectivitymaking it an unreliable signpost for the court. All of these concerns should lead the Wisconsin Supreme Court to stop its current ritual of examining the entrails of a provision's history when the text is unambiguous.
IV. THE CASE FOR INTERPRETIVE CONSISTENCY
Rather than focus on concerns about intent-based interpretation like those outlined above, the Kalal majority sought to advance positive goods associated with the rule of law through its insistence on a text-first approach to statutory interpretation. 133 The majority believed that "[a]n interpretive method that focuses on textual, intrinsic sources of statutory meaning and cabins the use of extrinsic sources of legislative intent is grounded in more than a mistrust of legislative history or cynicism about the capacity of the legislative or judicial processes to be manipulated." Ours is "a government of laws not men," and "it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated." "It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us." In Scalia's vision, the Constitution is analogous to a statute, and it should be interpreted in accordance with the same norms and interpretive aims that apply to statutes. Scalia thus embraces a principle of democratic interpretive uniformity under which the enactedness of a legal text determines that it will be interpreted according the same interpretive norms as apply to other democratically enacted texts-textualist originalism.
141
In addition to Scalia and several of his brethren on the U.S. Supreme Court, many state courts already use the same methods of construction for both statutory and constitutional cases. courts use the same methods of construction whether a law was passed by the usual legislative process or by a statewide referendum.
143
In sum, Justice Diane Sykes and her colleagues in the Kalal majority sought to establish a method of statutory interpretation that honored the rule of law in Wisconsin. 144 They placed the court's focus on the text of the statute before them because only the text possesses the force of law. 145 The same noble motives and persuasive reasons should lead the court to adopt a Kalal framework for constitutional interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued its decision in Kalal, a majority of the court decided to adopt a particular method of statutory interpretation for all subsequent decisions by Wisconsin courts. 146 In doing so, the court chose to avoid the problems associated with legislative history, both practical and jurisprudential. Instead, the justices chose to honor the rule of law by focusing first on the enacted text of the law.
The considerations that drove the court's majority in Kalal should lead it to reject the current method it uses to interpret the state constitution. The Busé methodology relies on flawed sources in a futile attempt to discover a mythical common intent. Moreover, replacing Busé with a textualist methodology would advance the rule-of-law values that inspired Kalal.
In its next constitutional-interpretation case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should draw upon Coulee Catholic Schools v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n 147 to finally and emphatically end the reign of Sinclair and
